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Accuracy Goals

G. Alexander Nunn, Accuracy Goals in Nunn on Evidence (2025), available at https://nunn.law/accuracy-goals. | View history

At its very core, the law of evidence is driven by a profound, if sometimes elusive, aspiration: the pursuit of truth and the accurate determination of facts in legal proceedings. This commitment is not merely an implicit understanding; it is explicitly enshrined and serves as the lodestar guiding the interpretation and application of evidentiary principles. Our initial exploration, therefore, will focus exclusively on this theoretical bedrock – the system's dedication to accuracy as an independent and primary objective.

Key Overview: The Axiomatic Goal of Ascertaining Truth

The Federal Rules of Evidence, which govern proceedings in federal courts and serve as a model for many state evidence codes, provide a clear articulation of this fundamental purpose. Rule 102, in its concise yet powerful language, states that the rules "should be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination." That final phrase, "to the end of ascertaining the truth," is the linchpin of our current discussion. It declares, unequivocally, that a central aim of the entire evidentiary apparatus is to discover what truly transpired, to reconstruct past events with the greatest fidelity possible within the confines of a formal legal process.

This pursuit of truth is not merely an academic ideal; it is profoundly utilitarian. For the legal system to command respect, dispense justice, and effectively regulate societal conduct, its outcomes must be perceived as resting upon a foundation of factual accuracy. If verdicts were seen as arbitrary or divorced from the actual events giving rise to a dispute, the legitimacy of the entire legal enterprise would be critically undermined. Thus, the commitment to accurate fact-finding is integral to achieving "just determinations." A just outcome, in most conceivable scenarios, presupposes that the facts upon which it is based are, as nearly as can be managed, the true facts. This objective of truth-seeking, therefore, stands as an independent and primary goal, even as we will later explore (in Section 1.2.2) how it must sometimes be balanced against other important societal values. For now, however, our focus remains steadfastly on understanding this accuracy principle in its own right.

Understanding "Truth" in the Adjudicative Arena

While the aspiration to ascertain "the truth" sounds straightforward, the concept of truth itself has been a subject of philosophical debate for millennia. In the context of legal proceedings, several conceptions of truth subtly influence how we approach the task of fact-finding, and it's beneficial to understand these underlying perspectives.

The most intuitive and historically dominant view within the legal sphere is the correspondence theory of truth. This theory posits that a statement or belief is true if it accurately reflects or corresponds to an objective, external reality. When a witness testifies that the traffic light was red, the correspondence theory would hold that statement to be true if, indeed, the traffic light was red at that moment in the real world. The legal system's endeavor to reconstruct past events – to determine "what actually happened" – leans heavily on this ideal. The fact-finder, whether judge or jury, is implicitly charged with comparing the evidence presented to a presumed historical reality and determining which narrative best aligns with that reality.

However, the adjudicative process also, and perhaps inevitably, engages with the coherence theory of truth. This perspective suggests that the truth of a proposition is determined by its consistency and logical fit within a broader system of beliefs or, in our context, a body of evidence. In a trial, the fact-finder is often presented with multiple, sometimes conflicting, pieces of evidence. Their task involves weaving these strands into a coherent narrative. A version of events is deemed more likely to be "true" if it forms an internally consistent, logical, and plausible story that accounts for the various pieces of accepted evidence. For instance, if several pieces of circumstantial evidence, each somewhat ambiguous on its own, all point towards a particular conclusion when considered together, that conclusion gains credibility through its coherence. While a coherent story is not necessarily true in the correspondence sense (a well-constructed lie can be highly coherent), the human mind, and thus the legal process it employs, often relies on coherence as a strong indicator of probable truth, especially when direct access to unvarnished historical fact is impossible.

Finally, pragmatic approaches to truth also find resonance within the legal system. Philosophers like William James and John Dewey, associated with pragmatism, emphasized the idea of truth as what "works" or what is most useful for practical purposes. In the legal context, "truth" can sometimes be understood as the set of facts established through the accepted procedures, according to the prescribed burdens of proof, which allows for the stable and authoritative resolution of a dispute. A verdict, for example, establishes a form of "legal truth" that society agrees to accept for the purpose of finality and order, even if nagging doubts about its absolute correspondence with objective reality might persist. This pragmatic dimension acknowledges that the legal system must conclude disputes and cannot engage in an endless quest for perfect, epistemologically certain truth. The "truth" determined by a court is the truth as best as can be determined and validated through the lens of the adversarial process and the rules of evidence.

While the correspondence theory often represents the ultimate ideal in legal fact-finding, the practicalities of adjudication mean that coherence and pragmatic considerations are indispensable. The legal system strives for an accurate reflection of past events, but it achieves this by assessing the coherence of narratives and by ultimately producing a pragmatically workable resolution based on the evidence presented and permitted.

The Distinctive Character of Legal Truth-Seeking

It is crucial to distinguish the legal system's pursuit of truth from the methodologies and objectives of scientific or philosophical inquiry. While all may share a nominal commitment to "truth," the nature of that truth and the means of its pursuit differ significantly, shaped by the unique functions and constraints of the legal domain.

One primary distinction lies in purpose and scope. Scientific inquiry generally seeks to uncover generalizable, empirical truths about the natural world. It often involves repeatable experiments, the formulation and testing of hypotheses, and its conclusions are perpetually open to revision in light of new evidence or improved methodologies. Philosophical inquiry delves into fundamental questions about existence, knowledge, values, and reason, often employing logical analysis and conceptual clarification rather than empirical investigation. In contrast, legal truth-seeking is highly particularized. Its purpose is to resolve specific disputes between specific parties by reconstructing unique, non-repeatable past events to assign rights, responsibilities, or culpability. The legal system demands finality; a judgment, once rendered and appeals exhausted, generally stands as the definitive resolution of the factual issues in that case.

Another critical difference arises from constraints and methods. Scientific investigation, ideally, is less encumbered by strict temporal deadlines or resource limitations in its pursuit of knowledge. It emphasizes methodological rigor, peer review, and replicability. Philosophical discourse is driven by logical argument and critical analysis, often unbound by the need for immediate empirical data collection. Legal proceedings, however, operate under significant constraints. Trials must occur within reasonable timeframes, and the parties, as well as the state, operate with finite resources. This necessitates procedural rules and evidentiary gatekeeping mechanisms that, while often designed to enhance reliability, can also limit the scope of inquiry. The "truth" that emerges is one that can be established within these practical boundaries. Moreover, the legal system is predominantly adversarial, relying on opposing parties to present and challenge evidence, a method quite different from the often collaborative or iterative nature of scientific discovery.

Finally, the standards of certainty differ. Science often seeks high degrees of statistical probability or aims for theories that are falsifiable. Philosophy may strive for logical certainty or deeply robust justifications. The legal system, acknowledging the inherent uncertainties in reconstructing past human events, employs specific burdens of proof—such as "preponderance of the evidence" in most civil cases or "beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal cases. These standards are, by their nature, probabilistic. They represent thresholds for belief deemed sufficient for societal purposes, not guarantees of absolute or objective certainty. The "truth" found by a court is thus an adjudicative truth, a determination of facts deemed sufficiently probable given the evidence presented within a structured, rule-bound, and adversarial process. It is a practical truth, designed to enable decision-making and action, rather than the open-ended, ever-refinable truth often pursued in science or the abstract, conceptual truths sought in philosophy.

The Aspiration for the "Best Available Evidence"

Implicit within the legal system's commitment to accurate fact-finding is a foundational, albeit often unstated, preference known as the "best available evidence" principle. This is not a specific, codified rule in the same way as, for example, the rule against hearsay (which we will explore in Chapter 6) or the requirements for authenticating documents. Rather, it's a guiding concept, a philosophical undercurrent that influences the development and application of many specific evidentiary doctrines. The core idea is that, to maximize the likelihood of arriving at the truth, adjudicators should, whenever feasible, rely on the most direct, reliable, and untainted forms of proof relevant to the matter at hand.

This principle manifests in a general inclination towards evidence that is perceived to have a closer nexus to the actual events or facts in question, and is less susceptible to error, distortion, or manipulation. For instance, the system generally prefers an original signed contract over a party's recollection of its terms, or the direct testimony of an eyewitness over a second-hand account of what that eyewitness supposedly saw. This preference is rooted in the common-sense understanding that proximity to the source of information often correlates with reliability. Evidence that has passed through fewer interpretive filters, or is less reliant on the frailties of human memory or perception over extended periods, is intuitively considered "better" for the purpose of accurate reconstruction.

It's important to understand that this aspiration for the "best available evidence" does not mean that only perfect or infallible proof is admissible, nor does it imply that second-best evidence is always excluded. The legal system is intensely practical. It recognizes that the "best" conceivable evidence may have been destroyed, may be unobtainable, or its retrieval might entail costs or delays wholly disproportionate to its probative value. Therefore, the principle operates more as a guidepost, encouraging the use of superior forms of evidence when reasonably accessible and urging caution when relying on evidence that is more attenuated or inherently less reliable. The numerous specific rules of evidence we will study often reflect an attempt to operationalize this preference, balancing the desire for the "best" evidence against the practical realities of litigation and the need to consider other competing values.

The Adversarial Process: A Theoretic Engine for Accuracy

The dominant mode of trial procedure in common law jurisdictions, including the United States, is the adversarial system. This system is structured around the belief that truth is most likely to emerge from a structured contest between opposing parties, each presenting their version of the facts and vigorously challenging the assertions of the other, all before a neutral and passive fact-finder, typically a judge or jury. This model is, at least in theory, intrinsically linked to the goal of accurate fact-finding.

The theoretical strength of the adversarial system in promoting accuracy rests on several pillars. Firstly, it harnesses partisan advocacy. Each party has a profound self-interest in unearthing and presenting all evidence that supports their claims and, equally, in exposing any flaws, inconsistencies, or falsehoods in the evidence proffered by their opponent. This powerful incentive, it is argued, leads to a more thorough investigation and presentation of relevant information than might occur in an inquisitorial system where a neutral judge or investigator takes the primary role in evidence gathering. The assumption is that two motivated adversaries, each scrutinizing the case from their own perspective, will collectively bring more facts to light.

Secondly, the adversarial system relies heavily on mechanisms designed to test the reliability of evidence. Chief among these is cross-examination, famously described by Wigmore as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." While the specific constitutional dimensions of cross-examination, particularly through the Confrontation Clause, are reserved for Chapter 12, its general function as a tool for probing witness testimony for accuracy, completeness, bias, and credibility is central to the adversarial ideal of truth-seeking. The opportunity to directly question an opposing witness allows for the exploration of weaknesses in their account, potentially revealing errors in perception, memory, or even deliberate misrepresentation.

Finally, the presence of a neutral and passive adjudicator is crucial. The judge or jury is expected to approach the case without preconceptions, to carefully consider the competing presentations of evidence and the results of their testing, and then to determine which version of the facts is most credible and best supported. By observing the clash of evidence and argument, the fact-finder is theoretically placed in the best position to discern the most accurate account of what transpired. The adversarial "battle" is thus intended to refine and clarify the facts, allowing a more reliable truth to emerge from the crucible of contested presentations.

Navigating the Inevitable Hurdles to Perfect Accuracy

Despite the profound commitment to truth and the theoretical strengths of mechanisms like the adversarial system, it is essential to acknowledge the inherent limitations and substantial challenges that prevent the legal system from achieving perfect or absolute accuracy in fact-finding. The "truth" ascertained in a courtroom is, at best, an approximation, shaped and constrained by a host of factors.

First, there are fundamental epistemological challenges. Human perception is not a flawless recording device; it is selective, influenced by context, and subject to error. Human memory is even more notoriously fallible; it is not a static retrieval system but a reconstructive process, vulnerable to decay over time, suggestion, post-event information, and inherent biases. Witnesses, however honest they may strive to be, can be mistaken. Furthermore, access to complete information about past events is often impossible. Evidence may be lost, intentionally destroyed, or simply never have existed in a discoverable form. Key witnesses may be unavailable or unable to testify. These are fundamental limitations on our ability to know the past with certainty, irrespective of the legal system's design.

Second, the legal system operates under significant systemic and practical constraints. As previously noted, legal proceedings are bounded by time limits. Trials cannot be endlessly protracted, nor can pre-trial investigations continue indefinitely. This means that the search for evidence, however diligent, must eventually conclude. Resource constraints are another major factor. Parties often possess vastly unequal financial resources, impacting their ability to conduct thorough investigations, hire expert witnesses (whose reliability standards we will examine in Chapter 7), or retain skilled legal counsel. Even the state, with its prosecutorial and public defense functions, operates under budgetary limitations. Moreover, the very existence of procedural and evidentiary rules, while often designed to enhance fairness or protect other societal values (topics for Section 1.2.2), means that some information, potentially relevant to discerning the absolute truth, might be excluded from the fact-finder's consideration. The human element also plays an undeniable role: lawyers, judges, and jurors are all fallible human beings, susceptible to errors in judgment, cognitive biases, and occasional lapses in diligence or impartiality.

Finally, the nature of legal proof itself reflects an acceptance of less-than-perfect certainty. Legal fact-finding culminates in a determination based on a specific standard of proof – preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt. These are thresholds for adjudicative belief, not guarantees of metaphysical truth. They implicitly acknowledge that the system aims for the best possible approximation of truth given its inherent limitations and the practical need for dispute resolution. The pursuit of truth in law is thus a pragmatic endeavor, striving for the most accurate and just outcomes achievable within a complex, constrained, and fundamentally human system. Recognizing these limitations is not to disparage the goal of truth-seeking, but rather to foster a realistic understanding of what the law of evidence can, and cannot, achieve.

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